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THREE STEPS FORWARD:
SHARED REGULATORY SPACE, DEFERENCE,
AND THE ROLE OF THE COURT
Amanda Shami*
When a party files suit challenging the legitimacy of an agency’s
interpretation of its governing statute, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. instructs courts to defer to the agency’s
interpretation where (1) the court has found that Congress had not
foreclosed the agency’s interpretation, and (2) the agency’s interpretation
was a reasonable or permissible exercise of its authority. However,
sometimes Congress enacts statutes delegating authority over a given
regulatory space to more than one agency. When two agencies have shared
authority under the same regulatory scheme, those agencies may disagree
regarding the interpretation of certain provisions that the agencies
administer. This forces courts to consider the applicability of Chevron: To
which agency does the court owe deference? All of the agencies? Only
one? Does the court owe deference at all?
Some courts refuse to award any deference where multiple agencies
administer a statute. Other courts do not view deference as precluded, and
they instead consider the reasonableness of the interpretations in awarding
the less substantial Skidmore deference. The courts’ differing treatments
are a subsidiary problem to a more fundamental issue: Why should the fact
that multiple agencies administer a statute affect the award of deference if
the interpretation is a reasonable exercise of authority?
This Note argues that courts should rely on the policies, considerations,
and canons of construction that gave way to and underlie the principles of
deference in determining to which agency the court should defer. The Note
offers a six-factor balancing test for courts to use in making this
assessment.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1578
I. TWO STEPS BACK: BACKGROUND ON DEFERENCE AND SHARED
REGULATORY SPACE ................................................................. 1580
A. Federal Agencies and Agency Deference ............................. 1581
1. Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations and
Deference Before Chevron............................................ 1581
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Boston University.
I would like to thank Professor James Brudney for his invaluable suggestions and guidance.
And I am forever grateful to my parents for their love, support, and limitless patience.

1577

1578

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

2. Chevron and Its Impact................................................. 1582
3. The Current Analytic Frameworks That Guide Agency
Deference Analyses ...................................................... 1584
4. Deference Policy Considerations and Implications ........ 1586
B. The Creation of Shared Regulatory Space ........................... 1589
1. Theoretical Approaches to the Creation of Shared
Regulatory Jurisdiction ................................................. 1591
2. Original Creation of Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction
Statutes......................................................................... 1593
3. Piecemeal Creation of Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction
Statutes......................................................................... 1595
4. Ambiguity Within Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction
Statutes......................................................................... 1596
II. THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP AND THE SKIDMORE SHUFFLE: THE
COURTS CONSIDER DEFERENCE AMONG MULTIPLE AGENCIES.. 1597
A. How Courts Adjudicate Shared Agency Jurisdiction ............ 1599
1. Chevron’s Applicability to Interagency Conflicts: ETSI
Pipeline Project v. Missouri.......................................... 1602
2. Deference Awarded: Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission .......................................... 1604
3. The Lower Courts Refuse Deference: Salleh v.
Christopher .................................................................. 1607
4. Applying Skidmore Rather than Chevron: Collins v.
National Transportation Safety Board .......................... 1609
B. Policies and Considerations Regarding Interagency
Conflicts............................................................................. 1610
III. THREE STEPS FORWARD: ADDING ONE MORE STEP TO CHEVRON 1613
A. The Proposal: Chevron Step Three..................................... 1614
B. Step Three at Work ............................................................. 1618
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 1620
INTRODUCTION
Consider a piece of legislation aimed at ensuring the safety of
bioengineered food. Assume Congress has delegated concurrent authority
to promulgate regulations with the force of law to both the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), which regulates the food safety standards for almost
all food products, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which
regulates the food safety standards related to meat, poultry, and processed
egg products. The statute delegates to both agencies authority over the
same regulatory space: the safety of the use of bioengineered food in
breeding cattle.
Further assume that each agency construes the statute differently so that
each interprets “safety” as it understands the term under its own regulations,
and the FDA’s regulations are more stringent. These interpretations
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directly conflict, and both agencies advocate on behalf of their
interpretation. Assume for the moment that the FDA’s standards were
promulgated without reference to any scientific study, but that the USDA’s
standards were the product of thorough and rigorous scientific study. And
assume that the USDA had been responsible for this particular regulatory
space since 1906 and that the FDA received its current authority in 1958.
How would a court confronting this situation resolve the conflict?
Typically, courts will defer to agency interpretations of statutes under
which the agency has regulatory control. But here, if both interpretations
meet the standards for receiving that deference, the court can only defer to
one agency; so how will it decide?
This problem occurs when Congress delegates shared regulatory
authority to multiple agencies in the same policy space.1 When Congress
delegates power and authority to only one agency to promulgate regulations
having the force of law, the agency deference issue is typically
straightforward.2 Where a party challenges either an agency’s statutory
interpretation or its regulation, the Chevron doctrine instructs courts to
defer to most agency judgments where the court has found that
(1) Congress has not explicitly foreclosed the agency’s decision, and (2) the
agency’s interpretation was reasonable or permissible.3 But when multiple
agencies have authority over a given statute, to whom does the court owe
deference on issues of statutory interpretation?4 All of the agencies? Only
one? Is deference precluded entirely?5
While it is unusual for agencies to directly oppose each other in court, it
is not exactly rare.6 “[A]gencies do not generally sue each other in court,”7
1. See generally Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared
Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and
Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Jason Marisam,
Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (2011); Michael Doran, Legislative
Organization and Administrative Redundancy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1815 (2011); Daniel
Lovejoy, Note, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple-Agency Statutes, 88
VA. L. REV. 879 (2002).
2. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1726–27
(2002).
3. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984).
4. Chao v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 540 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir.
2008) (“Left undecided by [the Supreme Court], however, is to whom does a reviewing court
defer when the [two agencies] offer conflicting interpretations of a provision of the Act.”).
5. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 2193, 2234–35 (2012).
6. See generally Joseph W. Mead, Interagency Litigation and Article III, 47 GA. L.
REV. 1217 (2013).
7. Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunction of MultipleGoal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 52 (2009); see also Neal Devins, Unitariness
and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82
CALIF. L. REV. 255 (1994) (describing the role of the Solicitor General in overseeing
government litigation and resolving interagency conflicts). Furthermore, the executive
branch has developed several avenues to resolve disputes between agencies internally. One
example is Executive Order 12,866, which outlines a process for resolving disagreements
among agency heads. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1994), reprinted as
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though they sometimes find themselves on either side of the court aisle
because of statutory split-enforcement arrangements or adjudicatory
relationships. 8 More often, conflicting agency views exist beneath the
surface and only become apparent when the action of another agency is
challenged. 9
This Note focuses on these instances of inconsistency and disagreement
between agencies tasked with overlapping regulatory authority. Part I
discusses the evolution of judicial review of agency interpretations
beginning with Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,10 and reviewing the impact and
implications of the Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.11 Part I also explains the several ways by
which Congress creates overlapping regulatory authority.
Part II
summarizes some considerations regarding issues of shared jurisdiction that
courts have confronted and analyzes the current interagency deference
conflict, exploring several cases in depth. Finally, Part III applies this
discourse and proposes a solution to the interagency deference conflict: the
addition of a Chevron Step Three to assist courts in determining which
agency is entitled to deference.
I. TWO STEPS BACK: BACKGROUND ON DEFERENCE
AND SHARED REGULATORY SPACE
This part surveys the current landscape with respect to agency deference
and shared regulatory space. Part I.A summarizes the topic of agencies and
agency deference generally. It includes a brief description of the history of
judicial review of agency determinations, the history of agency deference,
and a discussion of Skidmore, Chevron, and United States v. Mead Corp.12
as the articulations of the modern analytical framework for resolving
deference cases. Part I.A concludes with a survey of the policy implications
and considerations that underlie the deference framework.
Part I.B presents the different ways through which shared agency
jurisdiction can come to exist. Part I.B first presents a theoretical
framework to understand the ways Congress creates shared agency
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 108, 111 (Supp. IV 2010); see also Tex. State Comm’n
for the Blind v. United States, 796 F.2d 400, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (reviewing a conflict
between the Department of Education and the Department of Defense regarding
interpretations of a statute and noting that Executive Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. § 409.411
(1980), required the Department of Education to refer the matter for resolution to the
Department of Justice, which advised that it resolved the conflict in favor of the Department
of Defense).
8. See, e.g., Hinson v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 57 F.3d 1144, 1151–52 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (adjudicating a Federal Aviation Administration petition for review regarding a
National Transportation Safety Board order).
9. See, e.g., Gulf Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 452 F.3d 362, 367 (5th
Cir. 2006) (considering an agency action where the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, an administration of the Department of Commerce, disagreed with the
Department of Transportation’s action).
10. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
11. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
12. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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jurisdiction and then provides concrete examples illustrating the types of
shared space that exist. These include (1) the creation of shared regulatory
space through a single statute, (2) the piecemeal creation of shared
regulatory space through multiple statutes, and (3) the creation of potential
shared regulatory space through ambiguous statutes.
A. Federal Agencies and Agency Deference
This section presents the basic history and principles of judicial
deference that inform the discussions that follow on the problem of
interagency conflict in shared regulatory space.
1. Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations
and Deference Before Chevron
Even before Skidmore or Chevron, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed
reviewing courts to uphold regulations adopted by agencies pursuant to a
specific grant of legislative power unless the promulgating agency exceeded
the scope of its statutory authority.13 This deference principle was not
limited to agency rulemaking, but also extended to an agency’s exercise of
its formal adjudicatory authority.14 From the New Deal era through the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Chevron, the Court’s 1944 opinion in Skidmore
was the primary source for guidance on judicial review of administrative
interpretations and agency deference.15
In Skidmore, seven employees sued their employer for violations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in federal district court, seeking to
recover overtime pay for periods of time where they were on-call for the
employer, but not required to perform any specific tasks except to answer
fire alarms. 16 In construing the language of the FLSA, the district court
found that the hours employees spent on-call did not constitute hours
worked under the FLSA for which overtime compensation would be owed
to them. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.17
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed, finding that “the rulings,
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under [the FLSA], while
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
13. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U.S. 471, 474 (1937)
(“The regulation having been made by the commission in pursuance of constitutional
statutory authority, it has the same force as though prescribed in terms by the statute.”);
AT&T v. United States, 299 U.S. 232, 236–37 (1936) (“This court is not at liberty to
substitute its own discretion for that of administrative officers who have kept within the
bounds of their administrative powers.”).
14. See, e.g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412 (1941) (“Where, as here, a
determination has been left to an administrative body, this delegation will be respected and
the administrative conclusion left untouched.”).
15. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1239 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92
VA. L. REV. 187, 211 (2006).
16. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 135 (1944).
17. Id. at 136.
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may properly resort for guidance.”18 The Court articulated the factors that
courts should consider in their deference analysis: “[t]he weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in
[the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”19
Put another way, the Skidmore principle is that reviewing courts should
respectfully consider an interpretation of a statute by an agency or agency
official to which Congress has vested the primary responsibility in
administering that statute.20 Where a court is persuaded that the agency’s
executive, authority-based interpretation should receive total or partial
recognition in the outcome, that court should defer to that agency.21
Skidmore provided courts with a balancing standard for cases involving
agency deference that remained the primary guidance until Chevron.22
2. Chevron and Its Impact
In Chevron,23 the Supreme Court considered a challenge to an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulation promulgated under the
Clean Air Act.24 The case involved permit programs in states that had not
met federal ambient air quality requirements (the “nonattainment” states).25
The EPA regulations required nonattainment states to establish a permit
program for “new or modified major stationary sources” of air pollution26
and precluded the issuance of permits to a new or modified source unless it
met those requirements.27
Before the 1980s, the EPA had treated any pollution-emitting device in a
plant as a “source.”28 In 1981, the EPA decided that it would no longer
require a plant to apply for a permit if the modification of an existing device
or the installation of a new device did not increase the plant’s total
emissions.29 This new interpretation departed from the old understanding
that a “source” was each pollution-emitting device, replacing that
interpretation with a broader definition of “source” that included the whole
plant.30 This plant-wide definition of source would enable a company to
add or modify pollution-emitting devices as long as it reduced emissions

18. Id. at 140.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. John H. Reese, Bursting the Chevron Bubble: Clarifying the Scope of Judicial
Review in Troubled Times, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2004).
22. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 15, at 1247.
23. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7642 (1982).
25. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6).
27. Id. § 7503.
28. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev’d sub nom. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
29. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857–59.
30. Id. at 840.
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from another part of the same plant to result in no net increase in
emissions.31
The question before the Court in Chevron was whether the plantwide
definition of “source” violated the Clean Air Act. 32 Before reaching the
Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit held that it did. 33 For the circuit court, the
purpose of the nonattainment program was to bring about state compliance
with federal air quality requirements in those states where compliance was
lagging, and the plantwide definition of source was inconsistent with that
overriding goal.34 The court was unable to point to a particular provision
that barred the EPA’s plantwide definition, but it said that the EPA’s
definition was inconsistent with the general purposes of the nonattainment
program. 35
The Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Circuit’s rationale.36 The Court
found that nothing in the statute or its legislative history spoke to the issue
of whether the plant or each pollution-emitting device within it amounted to
a “source.”37 The Court further found that the general objectives of the
nonattainment program, embodying an effort to promote environmental
quality with minimal restrictions on economic growth, were simply too
broad to provide such a narrow definition.38
Because Congress had not directly addressed the exact conflict at issue,
the question before the Court was whether a permissible construction of the
statute grounded the agency’s interpretation.39 For the Court, “considerable
weight should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”40 In adjudicating the matter,
the Supreme Court created the now-famous Chevron two-step inquiry: a
court first asks whether Congress had explicitly foreclosed the agency’s
interpretation (Step One), and if the answer is Congress has not, then the
court asks whether that interpretation was reasonable or permissible (Step
Two). 41 Though seemingly straightforward, the Chevron two-step inquiry
becomes complex in a variety of cases.42

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 726.
34. Id. at 727–28.
35. Id.
36. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
37. Id. at 842, 851.
38. Id. at 851, 862.
39. Id. at 842.
40. Id. at 844.
41. Id. at 843–44 (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative
delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a
case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (citations omitted)).
42. For further reading on Chevron, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its
Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L.
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Since Chevron, three major justifications have been articulated as support
for a presumption in favor of deferring to an agency’s interpretation. The
first justification is congressional intent—that Congress, in delegating
authority to agencies, intends for the agencies to be the principal
interpreters of regulatory statutes.43 The Supreme Court has relied on this
rationale in subsequent opinions,44 but Justice Scalia and others highlight
that this intent is a “fictional” construct as means to legitimize their
deference to the agency.45 The second and third justifications in support of
agency deference come from the majority holding in Chevron, where the
Court emphasized the specialized agencies’ relatively greater technical
expertise and the agencies’ superior political accountability, noting that
agencies are accountable to the electorate through the President.46
3. The Current Analytic Frameworks
That Guide Agency Deference Analyses
In 2001, the Supreme Court somewhat clarified the approaches courts
should use in adjudicating cases of agency deference in United States v.
Mead Corp.47 Mead involved a U.S. Customs Service’s decision, based on
its interpretive rules, to classify certain day planners Mead Corporation
imported as “diaries” rather than as “other items” of a similar sort.48 This
classification meant that a 4 percent tariff would apply to each day planner
Mead sought to import into the United States, whereas if the planners
received the categorization of “other items,” no tariff would apply.49 The
Court of International Trade affirmed the Government’s classification, but
the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the Customs Service’s
classification did not warrant either Chevron deference or any other
deference scheme. 50
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that while Chevron
deference was inappropriate there, the interpretive rules could receive
Skidmore deference. 51 The Court held that interpretative rules did not merit
Chevron deference unless the statute authorizing the agency delegates

REV. 301 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 2071 (1990).
43. See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2109.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
45. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517; see also Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986); Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2637, 2642–43 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s
Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2589 (2006).
46. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
47. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
48. Id. at 220–26.
49. Id. at 224–25.
50. Id. at 225–26.
51. Id. at 235.
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lawmaking power to the agency.52 As applied to Mead, the Court held that
the Customs Service’s classification rules could not receive Chevron
deference because they “present a case far removed not only from noticeand-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably
suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving
the deference claimed for them here.”53 The Court continued that the
agency could raise a claim that the rule deserved Skidmore deference based
on the ruling’s “thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with prior
interpretations, and any other sources of weight.”54
Following the Court’s ruling in Mead, scholars have recognized the
current scheme for resolving questions regarding agency deference to
include three distinct analytic approaches.55 In what scholars have termed
“Step Zero,”56 Mead instructs a reviewing court to first determine whether
Congress had delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law; if the court determines that Congress has, then the
court asks whether the agency promulgated the regulation at issue in the
exercise of that authority. 57 These two questions provide courts with a
threshold inquiry as to which one of the two deference standards, Chevron
or Skidmore, applies.58 If the court answers either question in the negative,
then the court applies the Skidmore balancing inquiry, which is the first
analytic framework.59 If the court answers both questions in the
affirmative, then the court moves on to the Chevron analysis.60
Chevron deference, the second analytic framework, is an “all-or-nothing
proposition,” whereas Skidmore views deference “along a sliding scale”
where the court assesses the agency’s interpretation against multiple factors
to determine what weight of deference the agency should receive.61
Accordingly, courts award “various degrees of deference, ranging from
none, to slight, to great, depending on the court’s assessment of the strength
of the agency interpretation under consideration.”62
However, if a court answers the two Step Zero questions in the
affirmative, the court then applies the Chevron two-step inquiry. 63 Chevron
Step One asks whether the statute is ambiguous; if the court determines the
52. See id. at 229 (recognizing “express congressional authorizations to engage in the
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings” as meriting of
Chevron deference).
53. Id. at 231.
54. Id. at 235.
55. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833 (2001).
56. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 55, at 836; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 191.
57. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (requiring courts to consider whether Congress gave the
agency in question the authority to bind regulated parties with “the force of law” and, if so,
whether the agency “exercise[d] . . . that authority”).
58. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 15, at 1247.
59. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 55, at 873.
60. See id.
61. Id. at 855.
62. Id.
63. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
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statute is ambiguous, then the court moves to Step Two, which asks
whether the interpretation is a permissible reading of the statute.64 If the
court answers either Step One or Step Two in the negative, then the court
turns to a de novo review of the agency’s interpretation.65
At the same time, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) instructs
courts to decide “all relevant questions of law” using de novo review, 66
which is the third analytic approach to considering issues of agency
interpretation of statutes. Though courts have had de novo authority over
statutory interpretation since the APA’s enactment, courts have used their
discretion to defer to certain agency interpretations rather than use de novo
review. 67 Accordingly, courts have discretion to undertake a de novo
review or to apply a deference regime to cases involving agency
interpretations.68 In sum, Mead represents the current regime, which
includes the Chevron inquiry, the Skidmore balancing test, and de novo
review. 69
4. Deference Policy Considerations and Implications
Some scholars argue that when courts refuse to award deference to
reasonable agency interpretations of statutes, they undermine the
longstanding deference doctrine and the general idea that courts should not
supplant their interpretations for the interpretations of the agency.70
Scholars have argued that an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a
statute it administers should prevail over whatever interpretation the court
presents as an alternative. 71 The reasons and values that an agency’s
interpretation should prevail include (1) democratic theory, policymaking,
and politics; (2) comparative competence; (3) flexibility; and (4) national
uniformity.72 First, adopting the agency’s interpretations serves democratic
64. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
65. See id.
66. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
67. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Policymaking, 44 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 375, 380 (2002) (citing ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, 77th
CONG., REP. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 90–91 (Comm.
Print 1941)).
68. See ATT’Y GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, 77th CONG., REP. ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 90–91 (Comm. Print 1941) (noting
that courts may approach questions of statutory interpretation de novo or they may opt to
determine whether the agency interpretation has substantial support rather than determine
what the court perceives as the correct interpretation).
69. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 15, at 1248.
70. See, e.g., Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes:
An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255 (1988); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
81 (1985); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG.
283 (1986); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1093 (1987).
71. See, e.g., Byse, supra note 70, at 257; Starr, supra note 70, at 307–08.
72. Byse, supra note 70, at 257.
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theory, policymaking, and politics because this adoption is a “mechanism
‘for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires of the
The rationale is that delegations of authority to
electorate.’”73
administrative agencies allow the electorate to secure a change in policies
via its election of the President to office; in turn, this promotes democratic
values and political accountability. 74
Second, comparative competence involves the notion that the agency has
superior skills as compared to the judiciary because of the expertise the
agency has honed in managing its responsibilities.75 This competence
arises from the agency’s technical and professional experts, its day-to-day
interactions with the industry it regulates, its relationships with the relevant
congressional committees, its relationships with other government agencies,
its experience in dealing with problems, and its experience in managing its
administrative responsibilities generally, which include rulemaking,
adjudication, investigation, negotiation, and prosecution.76 Furthermore,
and related to this point of competence, the disparity between the expertise
of the agency and that of the court has only widened in recent years as
federal statutory programs have become more complex.77 The complexity
is such that most federal judges would be unable to conceive of all of the
ramifications triggered by the narrow questions that come before them.78
And the complexity of federal statutory law is not limited to multiple or
conflicting purposes but also includes the existence of interlocking
provisions that only an expert may fully comprehend.79 Accordingly, some
scholars suggest that a practice in favor of deference to agency
interpretations is necessary to ensure that laws are “internally coherent.”80
Third, scholars identify agency flexibility, noting that once a court has
interpreted a statute, it is unlikely that the interpretation may change
because of principles of stare decisis; in contrast, an agency is free to
change its own interpretation in light of new scientific or other
Thus, if the
developments (so long as it remains reasonable).81
interpretative responsibility belonged to the judiciary, this would restrict the
agency’s flexibility to adapt to new technology or policy considerations.82
Finally, considerations of national uniformity provide further support for
leaving the statutory interpretations in the hands of the relevant agency.83
Agencies face lawsuits across the country, and if the judiciary does not
adhere to Chevron principles uniformly, then the agency would be subject
to differing and inconsistent rulings, a result that would frustrate the goal of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. (quoting Mashaw, supra note 70, at 95).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 258.
Id. (citing Starr, supra note 70, at 309–10).
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 55, at 861.
Id.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Byse, supra note 70, at 259.
Id.
Id.
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a uniform, nationwide administration. 84 A presumption in favor of the
agency would prevent a national law that varied in application from region
to region. 85
Other scholars argue that separation of powers requires courts to award
deference to an agency’s reasonable and permissible interpretation of its
statute.86 These scholars suggest that courts owe deference to agency
interpretations because the agency-court relationship is not a supervisory
relationship but rather is a relationship between two branches of
government and thus premised on norms of respect and noninterference.87
Though the deference courts owe to agencies is not on par with the
deference courts accord to Congress or the President, it remains that the
congressional decision to delegate power to an agency (and that agency’s
political accountability via the executive) compel courts to defer where the
agency presents a reasonable statutory interpretation.88
Moreover, Congress does not always speak in precise language, nor does
it expressly delegate when and how courts should award deference.89
When the legislature has not been clear, courts should, in the first instance,
attempt to determine what Congress may have intended.90 Where the
courts cannot determine the congressional intent,91 courts should engage in
a value assessment of which regime is the “most sensible one to attribute to
Congress under the circumstances.”92 As Professor Sunstein notes, “[t]his
assessment is not a mechanical exercise of uncovering an actual legislative
decision,” but one which “calls for a frankly value-laden judgment about
comparative competence, undertaken in light of the regulatory structure and
applicable constitutional considerations.”93
As a separate matter, though some have argued for the elimination of
Skidmore from the deference regime, 94 the relevance of the framework and
recent scholarship on its reemergence within the context of Chevron
support the position that Skidmore remains an integral part separately from

84. Id. (citing Strauss, supra note 70, at 1121–22).
85. Id. at 259–60; Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the
Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 282 (1988).
86. Kmiec, supra note 85, at 269.
87. Id. at 270 (citing Starr, supra note 70, at 300).
88. Kmiec, supra note 85, at 281.
89. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2086.
90. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 337–38 (1986) (arguing that statutory
interpretation is a process of making a statute “the best piece of statesmanship it can be” by
finding “the best justification . . . of a past legislative event”).
91. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2086 (“Sometimes congressional views cannot plausibly
be aggregated in a way that reflects a clear resolution of regulatory problems, many of them
barely foreseen or indeed unforeseeable.”).
92. Id. (encouraging this method where the courts confront the more frequent issue of
one agency’s interpretations). Professor Sunstein’s suggestion is just as applicable where
two or more agencies vie for deference. See infra Part III.
93. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2086.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 256–59 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Claire R. Kelly, The Brand X Liberation: Doing Away with Chevron’s Second
Step As Well As Other Doctrines of Deference, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 195–98 (2010).

2014]

SHARED REGULATORY SPACE AND CHEVRON

1589

and as an implicit part of the Chevron analysis itself.95 Some scholars
argue that an underappreciated feature of Chevron’s Step One requirement
is that this process itself implicitly uses Skidmore.96 This is the case
because the history of an agency’s interpretation is relevant to a court’s
determination of whether Congress has delegated unambiguous authority to
the agency.97 In assessing Step One, courts consider the consistency and
the longstanding nature of the interpretation, both of which are explicit
factors in Skidmore.98 An agency’s expertise, both a Skidmore factor and
Chevron consideration, is also relevant to a court’s determination whether
the statute supports the agency’s interpretation.99 Moreover, an agency’s
participation in the statute’s legislative history is pertinent to the Step One
inquiry. 100 In this way, courts undertake the first step of Chevron through a
Skidmore “lens,” giving Skidmore weight to the means by which the agency
interpreted its authority under its authorizing statute.101
B. The Creation of Shared Regulatory Space
Congress often delegates shared and overlapping regulatory authority to
multiple agencies,102 and it is not unusual to see more than one agency
responsible for certain regulated activity.103 Congress often delegates the
same or similar functions to more than one agency or compartmentalizes
regulatory space across multiple agencies, assigning each agency a discrete
area to regulate.104 These instances are not uncommon—they are present in
virtually all areas of social and economic regulation, from food safety to
95. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 449; Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—
Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143,
1145–46 (2012).
96. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 95, at 449; see also Byse, supra note 70, at 265–66.
97. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 95, at 449.
98. Id. at 449; Strauss, supra note 95, at 1145–46.
99. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 95, at 449.
100. Id. at 449 n.151 (noting that the Supreme Court emphasized the agency’s
participation in the statute’s legislative history in United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310
U.S. 534, 549 (1940)).
101. Id. at 449–50. In 1988, four years after the Supreme Court handed down Chevron,
Clark Byse advocated for a Chevron Step One where courts pay particular attention to
(a) the [agency’s] reasoning in support of its interpretation, (b) the potential or
likelihood that later developments might indicate the appropriateness of a different
interpretation, (c) the advantages of nationwide uniformity in the administration of
federal statutes, (d) the desirability of allowing for presidential influence of
policymaking, and (e) the fact that the [agency’s] interpretation, “while not
controlling upon the courts . . . , do[es] constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which [the reviewing court] . . . may properly resort for
guidance.”
Byse, supra note 70, at 266 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
102. See, e.g., FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting
Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
103. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1; Gersen, supra note 1, at 160; Marisam,
supra note 1; Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1699–701 (2006).
104. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1134.
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financial regulation. 105 For example, both the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are responsible for antitrust
enforcement, even though in theory only one agency is necessary to enforce
U.S. antitrust policies.106 On the other hand, the FTC and DOJ may have
different characteristics that, when taken together, lead to a more
comprehensive antitrust enforcement regime.107
Another example is the food safety regulatory system, where fifteen
federal agencies are vested with varying responsibilities for ensuring food
safety. 108 Under the current scheme, the FDA, 109 the USDA,110 the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS),111 the EPA,112 and the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS),113 among others, each have some subset
of responsibilities. Though the agencies have coordinated with each other
via interagency agreements,114 the potential for conflict of interpretation
remains. 115

105. Id.
106. Id. at 1146 (citing Kelly Everett, Trust Issues: Will President Barack Obama
Reconcile the Tenuous Relationship Between Antitrust Enforcement Agencies?, 29 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 727, 754–58 (2009)).
107. As Freeman and Rossi point out, while DOJ is an agency of the executive branch,
the FTC is an independent agency, and in addition to their different structures and levels of
political accountability, the agencies possess differing (and arguably complementary)
features, including expertise, resources, and remedial tools. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1,
at 1146.
108. Id. at 1147 (citing Lyndsey Layton, Unsafe Eggs Linked to U.S. Failure to Act,
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2010, at A1).
109. The FDA performs the principal role and governs the food safety standards for
almost all food products. Id. at 1147 & n.49.
110. The USDA is responsible for governing the food safety standards related to meat,
poultry, and processed egg products. Id.
111. DHS is responsible for food security via monitoring and surveillance programs and
as such, creates vulnerability assessments, mitigation strategies, and response plans. Id. at
1147 & n.51.
112. The EPA regulates, among other things, the toxicity of pesticides and maximum
allowable residue levels on food commodities and animal feed. Id. at 1147 & nn.52–53.
113. NMFS, a component of the Department of Commerce, is responsible for conducting
fee-for-service inspections of seafood safety and quality. Id. at 1147 & nn.49–51; see also
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-435T, FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD
SAFETY: FDA’S FOOD PROTECTION PLAN PROPOSES POSITIVE FIRST STEPS, BUT CAPACITY TO
CARRY THEM OUT IS CRITICAL 3 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/
118821.pdf.
114. A typical interagency agreement resembles a contract in that it assigns responsibility
between the agencies, establishes procedures, and binds the agencies to fulfill mutual
commitments. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1161. However, these agreements are
generally unenforceable and unreviewable by courts. Id. For further reading on other agency
coordination tools, including interagency consultation, joint policymaking, and presidential
coordination, all of which agencies may use where overlapping regulatory space exists, see
id. at 1155–81.
115. For further examples of multiple agencies administering the same regulatory space,
see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE
POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE
REVENUE 5–154 (2011), available at http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf
(identifying thirty-four areas of duplicative agency programs); Freeman & Rossi, supra note
1, at 1151.
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The following subsections examine these delegations of shared authority,
first by outlining theoretical approaches to the types of congressional
delegations of authority, and then second by providing real examples of
these theoretical approaches, which illustrate the shared regulatory spaces
that exist. These actual examples are presented through the lens of
authority creation and include (1) the creation of shared regulatory space
through a single statute, (2) the piecemeal creation of shared regulatory
space through multiple statutes, and (3) the creation of potential shared
regulatory space through ambiguous statutes. This section’s organization
recognizes that framing the types of congressional delegations reflects only
the end result of those delegations—simply the kinds of shared regulatory
space that may exist. Accordingly, the beginning—the creation of that
shared regulatory space, including the when, why, and how—provides the
other half of the background on the existence of shared regulatory space.
The next section takes up that analysis.
1. Theoretical Approaches to the Creation
of Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction
As Professor Gersen explains, when Congress seeks to enact legislation
authorizing two agencies to regulate some policy space, there are four
theoretical models for the potential shared regulatory schemes.116 The four
variations turn on two elements: (1) exclusivity, that is, whether Congress
seeks to delegate authority to one agency alone or to both, and
(2) completeness, that is, whether Congress seeks to delegate authority to
act over the entire policy space or only a subset of the space.117 As an
example, if both agencies receive concurrent authority, Congress has
created a jurisdictional overlap, but if neither agency receives authority,
then Congress has created a jurisdictional underlap.118
The first variation involves situations where Congress delegates complete
and exclusive jurisdiction to the first agency over half a policy space and
complete and exclusive jurisdiction to the second agency over the other
half. 119 In this variation, on its face, Congress has not created overlapping
authority. 120
The second variation encompasses those situations where Congress
delegates incomplete and exclusive jurisdiction to each agency, which is to
say that, while the statute on its face has not created an overlap of authority,
there remains some element of the policy space that belongs to neither
agency (jurisdictional underlap).121
116. Gersen, supra note 1, at 208–09. For an alternate taxonomy on authority allocation,
see Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: A
Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19,
37–61 (2014).
117. Gersen, supra note 1, at 208.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 208–09.
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The third variation involves Congress delegating complete authority,
which is to say, the entire policy space has someone regulating it, but the
authority is nonexclusively assigned. 122 This means that Congress has
given some authority to both agencies such that jurisdiction is partially
overlapping.123
The fourth and final variation involves Congress delegating incomplete
and nonexclusive authority to both agencies.124 Here, each agency shares
some portion of its delegated authority with the other agency—
jurisdictional overlap—and like the second variation, there is jurisdictional
underlap in that some portion of the policy space goes unassigned. 125
Congress may have different policy reasons for creating such schemes.
Some political scientists have argued that overlapping and potentially
duplicative delegations might benefit Congress.126 In turn, legal scholars
have argued that overlapping regulatory jurisdiction can produce positive
effects because the overlap creates a productive competition among the
agencies,127 prompting them to produce “policy-relevant information.”128
Another scholar argues that overlapping regulatory authority across
multiple agencies may reduce congressional monitoring costs129 because
the overlap creates a system of interagency “fire alarms.”130 Another
articulation rests on public choice theory: overlapping delegations provide
congressional members with opportunities to take credit for decisions that
benefit their constituents and deflect blame on the agencies when things go
awry.131
Further, Congress may be legislating in order to avoid giving a single
agency responsibilities that conflict: tasking an agency to further the goals
of private industry while also tasking the same agency to promote general
122. Id. at 209.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. In addition to creating the potential for inconsistency and ambiguity among
agencies, variations three and four often create duplication of efforts and redundancy of
mission. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE
POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE
REVENUE 5–154 (2011), available at http:// www.gao.gov/new.items/d11318sp.pdf
(identifying thirty-four areas of duplicative agency programs). For a comprehensive
discussion of congressional duplication and redundancy, both intentional and inadvertent,
see Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237 (2011); Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies:
Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Eric Biber, The
More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of Administrative Law Scholarship,
125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78 (2012); Doran, supra note 1; and Marisam, supra note 1.
126. See, e.g., Michael M. Ting, A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy, 47 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 274 (2003).
127. Gersen, supra note 1, at 212.
128. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124
HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1463 (2011).
129. William A. Niskanen, Bureaucrats and Politicians, 18 J.L. & ECON. 617, 636–38
(1975).
130. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
131. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1139–40.
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public interest can and does lead to agencies focusing on the short-term
industry interests at the expense of the long-term public interests.132 In fact,
it was these kinds of conflicting missions that prompted Congress to strip
the Atomic Energy Commission of its development (furthering private
industry) and safety (furthering general public interest) missions and give
the development mission to the Department of Energy and the safety
mission to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.133
2. Original Creation of Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction Statutes
Congress can pass a single statute that creates shared regulatory
jurisdiction between two or more agencies. This shared space can exist as
either overlapping, compartmentalized, or competing jurisdiction.
One example of overlapping regulatory jurisdiction lies in the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982,134 which vested authority in three federal
agencies to oversee the Act’s purpose of disposing commercial nuclear
waste in a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.135 Under the
statutory scheme, the Department of Energy is responsible for designing
and ultimately operating the repository, the EPA is responsible for
establishing generally applicable standards for protecting the environment
from releases of radioactive materials, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission is responsible for licensing the Department of Energy’s
proposed repository. 136
A second illustration is the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,137 through which Congress vested
compartmentalized and complementary authority in multiple agencies.
Under the statutory regime, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s
(CFPB) role is to regulate financial products to protect consumers via
rulemaking,138 but its rules are subject to review by the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC), which includes heads of the Federal Reserve
and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) among the Council’s
members.139 The U.S. Treasury Department also has authority under the
Act, including the Treasury Secretary’s affirmative vote to subject a
132. Barkow, supra note 125, at 50–52; see also Biber, supra note 7, at 7 (“[A]gents will
have systematic incentives to privilege certain goals over others—specifically, to privilege
goals that are easily measured over conflicting goals that are difficult to measure.”).
133. Biber, supra note 7, at 33; Protecting the Public Interest: Understanding the Threat
of Agency Capture: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts,
111th Cong. 5–7 (2010) (statement of Nicholas Bagley, Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Michigan Law School).
134. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101–10270 (2012).
135. See id. § 10133.
136. See id. §§ 10132–10135 (describing the various roles of the government agencies).
137. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in sections of 7,
12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42 U.S.C.).
138. 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012); see also id. § 5512(b)(4)(B) (treating CFPB as if it “were
the only agency authorized to apply, enforce, interpret, or administer the provisions
of . . . Federal consumer financial law”).
139. Id. § 5321(b) (establishing the composition of FSOC); id. § 5513(c)(3)(A) (requiring
a two-thirds vote).
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nonbank financial institution to supervision by the Federal Reserve, 140 and
the power to initiate a liquidation process if he determines that a financial
company is in default or is in danger of default where default would
endanger the U.S. economy. 141
A third example involves the so-called split-enforcement model for
agency adjudications, which is where Congress divides a major area of
regulatory activity between two wholly separate and independent agencies,
giving one agency rulemaking authority and the second agency adjudicatory
authority. 142 The split-enforcement model differs from the better-known
arrangement where a single agency is responsible for all administrative or
regulatory functions, including rulemaking and enforcement.143 In this
way, the shared jurisdiction is arguably competing.
Several pieces of legislation conform to this model. One example is the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977144 (MSHA),
which assigns “developing and promulgating mandatory safety and health
standards for the nation’s mining industry” to the Mine Safety and Health
Administration. 145 The independent Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission, which is composed of five members, adjudicates
challenges to those standards.146 At the time that Congress enacted MSHA,
it was a unique model, but Congress has used the split-enforcement model
more since then. 147
Another illustration is the Occupational Safety and Health Act148
(OSHA). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (whose
parent agency is the Department of Labor) is responsible for setting and
enforcing health and safety standards, while the three-member Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission is responsible for adjudicating
challenges to those standards.149 In Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Commission,150 the Supreme Court confronted a conflict
between the Secretary of Labor and the Health Review Commission arising
out of OSHA. 151 As discussed in more detail later,152 the Court adhered to
the presumption that Congress delegates law-interpreting or “force of

140. Id. § 5323(a)(1).
141. Id. § 5383(b). For a more comprehensive summary of the Dodd-Frank Act, see
Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative Process,
65 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 693–709 (2013).
142. George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from
the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 315 (1987).
143. Id.
144. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–962 (2012).
145. Johnson, supra note 142, at 316.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 315.
148. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012).
149. Johnson, supra note 142, at 315; Hinson v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 57 F.3d 1144,
1147 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (split-enforcement in the area of aviation).
150. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
151. See generally Russell L. Weaver, Deference to Regulatory Interpretations: InterAgency Conflicts, 43 ALA. L. REV. 35 (1991).
152. See infra Part II.A.2.
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law”153 authority to a single agency154 and ultimately held that the
Secretary of Labor was the agency entitled to deference, not the
Commission.155
3. Piecemeal Creation of Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction Statutes
Congress can provide authority to one agency but then can give authority
to a second agency by passing a subsequent piece of legislation. Piecemeal
legislation is not unusual, and the creation of overlapping regulatory
authority may not be intentional; instead, it may simply result from the way
that Congress creates legislation on a “rolling basis,” where Congress
amends or revises existing statutory schemes to grant authority to additional
agencies.156 Because of this process, many times when there is overlapping
regulatory jurisdiction, it is the actions of several Congresses.157 This
piecemeal process can lead to the unintended consequence of inconsistent
or overlapping jurisdictions over regulatory areas.158
One example of this piecemeal legislation involves Congress’s efforts to
regulate unsafe food additives in 1958 with the passage of the Food
Additives Amendment, which empowered the FDA to regulate such
additives. 159 At the time of passage, the USDA was responsible for the
regulation of meat additives under the Meat Inspection Act of 1906.160
Congress specifically stated in the new bill that any meat additive that the
USDA had approved prior to 1958 was presumed safe and therefore exempt
from FDA review. 161 In an effort to harmonize the overlapping regulatory
space the 1958 Act created, Congress passed the Food Additives

153. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (reasoning that deference
is owed an agency “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority”).
154. According to Gersen, the Court implied the idea of single-agency deference by the
way the Court phrased the issue before it: “The question before us in this case is to which
administrative actor—the Secretary or the Commission—did Congress delegate this
‘interpretive’ lawmaking power under the OSH Act.” Gersen, supra note 1, at 223 (quoting
Martin, 499 U.S. at 151).
155. Martin, 499 U.S. at 157–58.
156. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1143. A historical example of legislation passed
on a rolling basis is Congress’s attempt to regulate the futures market. See Hunter v. FERC,
711 F.3d 155, 157 (D.C. Cir. 2013). As the court described in Hunter, Congress enacted the
Future Trading Act in 1921, but the Supreme Court held the regulatory scheme
unconstitutional. Id. (citing Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922)). Thereafter, Congress
enacted the Grain Futures Act in 1922 and the Commodity Exchange Act in 1936. Id. Later,
in 1974, Congress amended the Commodity Exchange Act to streamline the regulatory
scheme and established the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. Id.
157. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1143.
158. See id. (citing DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 7
(2003)).
159. Food Additives Amendment of 1958, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (2012) (delegating the
authority to review all food additives to the FDA).
160. Id. § 601 (delegating the authority to regulate all meat products to the USDA).
161. Id. § 321(s)(4); see also Pub. Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969, 972 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (discussing the “grandfather,” or “prior sanction,” exemption).
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Amendment of 1958,162 which created a presumption that a food additive
was unsafe (1) until proven otherwise or (2) unless the additive had been
exempted from this rule by statute or regulation.163 Although Congress
attempted to stem a conflict between the agencies, a federal suit nonetheless
arose that required the Court to determine whether a certain meat additive
fell under either FDA or USDA control.164 This example illustrates both
the piecemeal creation of shared regulatory space, as well as the conflict
that may continue despite attempts at a congressional remedy. 165
This potential inconsistency or competing authority only becomes a live
issue after the agencies find themselves trying to implement their
overlapping regulatory obligations.166 In some instances, it could even be
the judiciary that creates overlapping regulatory jurisdiction, interpreting a
certain statute to vest authority in one agency where another agency may
already have asserted regulatory jurisdiction.167
4. Ambiguity Within Shared Regulatory Jurisdiction Statutes
Statutory ambiguity with respect to regulatory jurisdiction can come to
exist in a few ways. As noted above, Professor Gersen’s third and fourth
variations illustrate theoretical examples where Congress delegates
nonexclusive jurisdiction to two agencies, in one variation the jurisdiction is
complete and in the other incomplete.168
One example of such an ambiguous statutory provision that creates the
potential for conflict is within the Biomass Energy and Alcohol Fuels
Act. 169 In that statute, Congress legislated that “[e]ither the Secretary of
Agriculture or the Secretary of Energy may be the Secretary concerned in
the case of any biomass energy project which will have an anticipated
annual production capacity of 15,000,000 gallons or more of ethanol.”170
In this way, either agency may regulate this particular area, and if the
agencies do not agree, the provision on its face does not provide the
judiciary guidance in resolving the conflict.
Even where the statute does not appear to overlap on its face and actually
appears to create very compartmentalized jurisdictions between two or
more agencies, an ambiguity may still arise. For example, in the

162. Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784.
163. 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) (1976).
164. See Foreman, 631 F.2d 969.
165. See Marisam, supra note 1, at 191–93.
166. Id. at 191–92.
167. Id. at 210 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007)). In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court created a potential regulatory jurisdiction overlap between
the EPA’s obligation to regulate vehicle emissions and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration’s regulation of vehicle fuel economy when the majority interpreted the Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1), to authorize the EPA with the regulation of greenhouse
gases. 549 U.S. at 532.
168. See supra notes 116–25 and accompanying text.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 8801 (2012).
170. Id. § 8812(a)(2)(A).
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Commodity Exchange Act,171 Congress authorized the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) to regulate trading of futures contracts,
including futures on securities and options on futures contracts.172
Congress had previously authorized the SEC to regulate trading of
securities and options on securities.173 Where an instrument was both a
security and a futures contract, the CFTC was to be the sole regulator
because the Commodity Exchange Act had explicitly held the CFTC to
have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to transactions involving contracts
of sale (and options on such contracts) for future delivery. 174 Where the
instrument was both a futures contract and an option on a security, the SEC
was to be the sole regulator as the Commodity Exchange Act had carved
out authority preventing the CFTC from having jurisdiction over any
transaction whereby the party to such transaction acquired any put, call, or
other option on one or more securities. 175
In Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC,176 the Seventh Circuit
considered this now modified regulatory scheme because while the CFTC
regulates futures and options on futures and the SEC regulates securities
and options on securities per this compartmentalization, the Commodity
Exchange Act did not define either contracts for future delivery or future
options.177 As a result, the financial instrument at issue in the case (index
participation) could have been characterized as either options on futures or
options on securities, and thus either the CFTC or SEC could have
reasonably asserted authority over index participation.178
II. THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP AND THE SKIDMORE SHUFFLE:179
THE COURTS CONSIDER DEFERENCE AMONG MULTIPLE AGENCIES
When reviewing an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute or
another statute giving the agency authority to regulate, courts may give
deference to that agency’s interpretation either under Chevron or
Skidmore.180 These cases almost always involve one federal agency’s

171. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
172. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A).
173. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012).
174. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1). However, the litigation that arose from this conflict, Chicago
Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), arose before subsequent
statutory revisions and, as such, is identified in the case as being codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a(ii)
(1988). 883 F.2d at 539.
175. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(C)(ii) (identified in Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 539, as
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2a(i) (1988)).
176. 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989).
177. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 883 F.2d at 539.
178. Id. at 539–48. The Seventh Circuit ultimately determined that the CFTC had
jurisdiction over the financial instrument. Id. at 548.
179. For the credit on this play on words and an examination on courts’ deference
considerations for positions advanced for the first time in litigation, see Bradley George
Hubbard, Comment, Deference to Agency Statutory Interpretations First Advanced in
Litigation? The Chevron Two-Step and the Skidmore Shuffle, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 447 (2013).
180. See supra notes 47–69 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of one statute,181 and underlying the Chevron opinion itself is
the assumption that only one agency is responsible for the statute at
issue.182 However, Congress does not always vest administrative authority
in only a single agency, and there are many occasions when Congress has
apportioned authority between two or more agencies.183 When two
agencies have shared authority under the same regulatory scheme, whether
the shared authority is overlapping, competing, or compartmentalized, those
agencies may disagree regarding the interpretation of certain provisions that
both agencies administer.184 Often times, federal agencies will have similar
interpretations of the statute they administer.185 Other times, these agencies
will have inconsistent interpretations or will disagree with each other
outright over the correct interpretation.186
Because a reviewing court may award deference to only one of these
agencies when their interpretations are inconsistent,187 courts have
conducted varying reviews in reaching a holding. This part first provides a
historical survey outlining judicial review of deference conflicts arising
from shared regulatory space and then sets out several cases where the
Supreme Court and circuit courts have confronted conflicts between two or
more agencies seeking deference to its respective statutory interpretation.
181. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. FAA, 564 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 2009)
(finding valid the Federal Aviation Administration’s interpretation of a provision in the
Airport and Airway Improvement Act).
182. According to Gersen, the Supreme Court implies this idea by the way it phrased the
issue presented in Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S.
144 (1991): “The question before us in this case is to which administrative actor—the
Secretary or the Commission—did Congress delegate this ‘interpretive’ lawmaking power
under the OSH Act.” Gersen, supra note 1, at 223 (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 151). See
also William Weaver, Note, Multiple-Agency Delegations & One-Agency Chevron, 67
VAND. L. REV. 275, 277 (2014) (“The traditional Chevron framework is a one-agency model
and is thus inappropriate for judicial review of the complex, multiagency form of
congressional delegation.”).
183. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42
U.S.C.) (apportioning authority between the Consumer Fraud Protection Bureau, Federal
Reserve, Securities & Exchange Commission, and U.S. Department of Treasury); see also
Weaver, supra note 151, at 37 n.10–12 (listing cases); infra Part I.B (describing the DoddFrank Act’s delegations to multiple agencies).
184. See, e.g., Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting “[t]he
diffusion of the interpretive authority among several agencies, and the possibility of
inconsistent interpretations”).
185. See, e.g., Individual Reference Servs. Grp., Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 16, 23
(D.D.C. 2001) (regulations were the result of coordinated effort among six agencies: FTC,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National
Credit Union Administration), aff’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42 (D.C.
Cir. 2002).
186. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144
(1991) (outlining the conflict between the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission and the Secretary of Labor).
187. Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 246 (2004) (noting that Chevron analysis as it stands now may not
resolve the dispute between two agencies because if a court awards deference to one, it
“offends the principle of deference to the view of the other”).
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A. How Courts Adjudicate Shared Agency Jurisdiction
The APA authorizes courts to review an agency’s interpretation of a
statute it administers.188 However, judicial review is not simply limited to
the standards in the APA. 189 As the Supreme Court held in Chevron, courts
should accept a federal administrative agency’s interpretation of its own
governing statute and regulations if “Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue,” and if the interpretation is reasonable.190
Chevron suggested that the degree of deference owed to an agency depends
on each particular situation.191
Under pre-Chevron case law, courts occasionally cited the fact that
multiple agencies administered a statute as a factor for giving reduced
deference to an agency’s interpretation.192 Relatedly, some courts adopted
a presumption of exclusive jurisdiction, which holds that Congress would
not vest law-interpreting authority in more than one agency; using this
presumption, courts interpret the statute to favor only one agency having
authority with the force of law despite multiple agencies receiving
delegations of authority. 193 For example, in California v. Kleppe,194 the
Ninth Circuit asked whether two agencies, the EPA and the Secretary of
Interior, had concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over air quality, 195 and
answered that question in the negative, holding that there was no
overlapping jurisdiction because such authority would “impair or frustrate
the authority which [the statute] grants to the Secretary.”196
At the same time, though the Ninth Circuit presented a theory of
exclusive jurisdiction, this position is in conflict with cases extending back
into the mid-twentieth century.197 And as one court noted, “[o]ther
agencies and their mandates . . . overlap,” and “not even a faint clue exists
that Congress desired otherwise.”198 Other courts that had considered
potentially overlapping jurisdiction schemes asserted that “when two
regulatory systems are applicable to a certain subject matter, they are to be
reconciled and, to the extent possible, both given effect.”199

188. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (stating that the “reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law”).
189. Id. § 706(2)(A) (stating that a court may invalidate a rule where the rule is “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
190. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
191. Id. at 842–45.
192. See, e.g., N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982); Gen.
Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144–45 (1976).
193. Gersen, supra note 1, at 222–25.
194. 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979).
195. Id. at 1192.
196. Id. at 1193–94.
197. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 689–93 (1948) (approving concurrent
FTC/DOJ jurisdiction); Pennsylvania v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 561 F.2d 278, 292
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (approving concurrent Interstate Commerce Commission/Federal Maritime
Commission jurisdiction); Friedlander v. U.S. Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp. 95, 103 (D.D.C.
1987) (approving concurrent FDA/FTC/U.S. Postal Service jurisdiction).
198. Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
199. Pennsylvania, 561 F.2d at 292.
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Issues of conflicting agency interpretations arose soon after Chevron,200
and the adjudication of those cases usually hinged on the assumption that
the reviewing court’s task was limited to “decid[ing] which agency [wa]s in
charge and defer[ring] to that agency’s interpretation.”201 As it stands now,
courts typically do not award Chevron deference to interpretations of
statutes of general applicability, such as the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) or the APA, which are administered by many agencies.202 This is
so because none of the agencies claiming an entitlement to deference has a
particular expertise in the substance of the statute.203
Even where the authorizing statute is narrower than general
administration, for example, only conferring authority to three agencies,204
the courts approach the inquiry in a variety of ways. In the D.C. Circuit, for
example, if multiple agencies are charged with administering a statute, an
agency’s interpretation is generally not entitled to Chevron deference;205
200. See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F.2d 694 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), rev’d sub nom. U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S.
597, 612–13 n.14 (1986) (reversing D.C. Circuit’s decision for “ignoring this longstanding
administrative interpretation” when it ruled against the Department of Transportation’s
predecessor agency when the President had tasked DOJ to coordinate all regulations
implementing the various civil rights laws); Keyes v. Sec’y of the Navy, 853 F.2d 1016,
1021 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that the Office of Personnel Management had primary
responsibility for administering the competitive service, and the Secretary of the Navy was
bound by that interpretation).
201. Weaver, supra note 151, at 39.
202. See, e.g., Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 137–38 n.9 (1997) (holding
that agency’s interpretation of the APA is not entitled to Chevron deference because the
APA is not a statute the agency is “charged with administering”); Bowen v. Am. Hosp.
Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 n.30 (1986) (holding that the Court owes no deference to one
agency’s interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act); Sherley v. Sebelius, 689 F.3d 776, 786
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 847 (2013) (reversing the lower court’s award of
Chevron deference to the National Institute of Health because the statutory authority at issue
was an “annual rider by its terms appli[cable] generally to multiple agencies”); Grand
Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 341–42 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding “the court owes no
deference” to an agency’s interpretation of the National Environmental Policy Act because
all federal agencies are responsible for the Act’s administration); Proffitt v. Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., 200 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that the court owes no deference to one
agency’s interpretation of a statute of limitations); Benavides v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 995
F.2d 269, 272 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the court owes no deference to agency’s
interpretation of the Privacy Act).
203. See Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(“Where a statute is generic, two bases for the Chevron presumption of implied delegation
are lacking: specialized agency expertise and the greater likelihood of achieving a unified
view through the agency than through review in multiple courts.” (citing Rehabilitation
Ass’n of Va., Inc. v. Kozlowski, 42 F.3d 1444, 1471 (4th Cir. 1994))).
204. See, e.g., Use of Real Property to Assist the Homeless, 56 Fed. Reg. 23,789 (May
24, 1991) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 581, 41 C.F.R. pt. 101-47, and 45 C.F.R. pt. 12a)
(identifying the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, General Services
Administration, and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development as promulgators
of a joint interim final rule).
205. Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding deference
inappropriate because the regulation was written and promulgated by the Department of
Defense, General Services Administration, and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and the “diffusion of the interpretive authority among several agencies, and
the possibility of inconsistent interpretations, weaken the case for deference”); see also
Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155, 156–57 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (declining to defer to either agency
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rather, the court reviews the agency’s interpretation de novo.206 In a similar
vein, where there is even the potential for conflicting regulations as a result
of multiple agencies administering the same statute, the Third Circuit holds
that Chevron is precluded entirely.207
In contrast, the Second Circuit adopted a different approach to the
deference question in 1185 Avenue of Americas Associates v. Resolution
Trust Corp. First, the court stated that it did not owe the full Chevron
deference to any interpretation, and then it determined which interpretation
was most reasonable between those proffered. 208
When analyzing the level of deference to award, if any, different courts
accord varying emphasis based on a host of factors, including whether one
agency is executive and the other is independent, 209 the statutory scheme,210
expertise, 211 and political accountability.212
regarding a “jurisdictional turf war” between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission). But see U.S. Postal Serv. v. Postal
Regulatory Comm’n, 599 F.3d 705, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (deferring to the Postal Regulatory
Commission because the particular provision at issue is the responsibility of the
Commission even though both the USPS and Commission have authority under the statute).
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit withholds Chevron deference both in instances of actual agency
conflict and potential agency conflict. See Rapaport v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 59 F.3d 212,
216–17 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding Chevron inapplicable either where “the same statute is
interpreted differently by the several agencies or the one agency that happens to reach the
courthouse first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all”); see also Wachtel v. Office
of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d 581, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
206. Grant Thornton, LLP v. Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 514 F.3d 1328, 1331
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that no automatic deference is owed to Office of the Comptroller
of Currency on the interpretation of Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)); Rapaport, 59 F.3d at 216–17 (no automatic deference
to Office of Thrift Supervision on the interpretation of FIRREA). The D.C. Circuit helpfully
divided the shared-enforcement schemes into three types. Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety
Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2003). First, where the statutes are generic, like the
APA and FOIA, the “broadly sprawling applicability undermines any basis for deference,
and courts must therefore review interpretative questions de novo.” Id. For statutes where
multiple agencies have specialized enforcement responsibilities, but there exists a risk of
inconsistent enforcement or uncertainty in the law because the agencies’ authorities overlap,
courts may find de novo review necessary. Id. Third, where expert enforcement agencies
have mutually exclusive authority over separate sets of regulated persons per statutory
outline, concerns about inconsistency and uncertainty do not diminish the weight of Chevron
deference. Id.
207. Chao v. Cmty. Trust Co., 474 F.3d 75, 85 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The mere fact that there
could be conflicting regulations should preclude Chevron deference.”); see also Catherine
M. Sharkey, Agency Coordination in Consumer Protection, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 329,
342–45 (describing the “traditional” approach of awarding no deference where more than
one agency administers a statute).
208. See, e.g., 1185 Ave. of Ams. Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d 494, 497
(2d Cir. 1994); see also Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1985)
(“[W]here . . . Congress has entrusted more than one federal agency with the administration
of a statute . . . a reviewing court does not . . . owe as much deference as it might otherwise
give if the interpretation were made by a single agency similarly entrusted with powers of
interpretation.”).
209. See, e.g., In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 440–41 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
210. See, e.g., Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144,
151 (1991).
211. Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
212. See, e.g., Martin, 499 U.S. at 156.
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Though the Seventh Circuit has suggested that “it is possible to defer
simultaneously to two incompatible agency positions,”213 presently there is
no case that purports to do so.
The Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of shared agency
jurisdiction under Chevron.214 In Bragdon v. Abbott,215 the Court noted the
question of whether enforcement by multiple agencies is incompatible with
Chevron deference but did not resolve that question.216 One term later in
Sutton v. United Air Lines,217 the Supreme Court confronted another case
where multiple agencies vied for deference. Though the Court highlighted
the fact that Congress gave three agencies the authority to issue regulations
implementing different provisions of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 218 the Court ultimately concluded that it did not need to determine
which agency deserved deference because all three agencies had adopted
impermissible interpretations.219
Because Congress continues to create shared regulatory jurisdiction,220
“a court must proceed with the utmost caution before concluding that one
agency may not regulate merely because another may.”221 Moreover, a
court should exercise further caution when considering a claim that one
agency has conclusively interpreted and settled an issue that an agency with
a different substantive jurisdiction may later interpret with a different
perspective. 222
The following cases illustrate the absence of a controlling deference
scheme by presenting conflicts that have varying statutory origins, present
varying types of shared regulatory spaces, and demonstrate the divergent
judicial rationales where the courts confront two or more agencies seeking
deference.
1. Chevron’s Applicability to Interagency Conflicts:
ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri
In 1988, the Supreme Court considered a case where two agencies
proffered opposing interpretations of a particular statute. Though the Court
ultimately sidestepped the issue of determining which agency it owed
deference, the case is important because the Court’s use of the Chevron
213. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 1999).
214. See John F. Cooney, Chevron Deference and the Dodd-Frank Act, 37 ADMIN. &
REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2012, at 7 (“[T]he question, long identified but not decided by the
Supreme Court,” asks “which agency’s interpretation of a statute, if any, is entitled to
deference under [Chevron], when Congress has delegated equal and overlapping authority to
multiple agencies.”).
215. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
216. Id. at 642 (“[W]e need not pause to inquire whether this causes us to withhold
deference to agency interpretations under [Chevron].”).
217. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
218. Id. at 478–80.
219. Id. at 482.
220. Thompson Med. Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
221. FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing Galliano v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 836 F.2d 1362, 1369–70 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
222. FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc).
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analysis counters the notion that interagency conflicts preclude the use of
Chevron. In ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri,223 the Secretary of the
Interior entered into a contract with a private company that allowed the
company to withdraw a specified quantity of water for industrial use from a
large federal reservoir.224 Several states sued, seeking injunctive relief to
prevent performance of the contract.225 These states argued that the
Secretary of the Interior had no statutory authority to enter into such a
contract, arguing that under the Flood Control Act of 1944,226 the authority
to approve any withdrawal of water from the reservoir belonged to the
Secretary of the Army, not the Department of the Interior.227 Moreover, the
states pointed to, and both the district court and court of appeals held as
undisputed, the fact that the Army Corps of Engineers, a part of the
Department of the Army, had constructed the reservoir and controlled its
operations.228
The Flood Control Act envisioned that both the Department of the
Interior and the Department of the Army229 would have roles in the
development of the reservoir.230 In so envisioning, Congress allocated
funds to both agencies to pursue their respective functions, 231 required
information-sharing between the agencies on any other projects within the
affected area,232 and conferred authority to both Departments to take certain
other actions in connection with the operation of the reservoir.233
However, the Supreme Court rejected the Secretary of the Interior’s
claim of entitlement to deference for the Department’s statutory
interpretation because the statute clearly indicated that the Department of
the Interior may not enter into a contract to withdraw water from an Army
reservoir without the approval of the Department of the Army.234 The Court
held that although the statute did delegate some authority over the ongoing
administration of the project to the Department of the Interior, and although
the text of the statute did not expressly speak to whether the Department
223. 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
224. Id. at 497–98.
225. Id. at 498.
226. Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified in scattered sections of titles 16,
33, 43 U.S.C.).
227. ETSI, 484 U.S. at 498.
228. Id. at 498–99.
229. The Flood Control Act actually referred to the Department of War, which is the
predecessor to the Department of the Army. Id. at 498.
230. Id. at 502.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 503.
233. See id. at 503–05.
234. See id. at 517. The statute specifically authorized “the Secretary of War . . . to make
contracts . . . at such prices and on such terms as he may deem reasonable, for domestic and
industrial uses for surplus water that may be available at any reservoir under the control of
the War Department.” Id. at 504 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court reasoned that
this explicit delegation to the Secretary of War entirely undermined the Department of the
Interior’s argument that the various powers granted to him could permit the contracts the
Department had entered into with ETSI Pipeline. Id. at 505. As a result, any contracts the
Department of Interior sought to create required the concurrence of the Secretary of the
Army, to whom Congress gave the authority to make such contracts. Id.
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had contractual authority, the reference to the Secretary of the Army’s
contractual power compelled the conclusion that the Department of the
Interior lacked the authority to contract.235
Accordingly, as between the interpretations proffered by both agencies,
the Court found that the Interior Secretary’s argument failed at Chevron
Step One, since the statute “indicate[d] clearly that the Interior Secretary
may not enter into a contract to withdraw water . . . without the approval of
the Department of the Army.”236 Finding that the Interior Secretary failed
at Step One, the Court saw no need to continue with the Chevron test.
However, the importance of this case is not the determination the Court
made, but rather the fact that the Court used Chevron to assess an
interagency conflict over statutory interpretation. This provides support for
the position that interagency conflicts and multiple delegations do not
preclude either Chevron analysis or Chevron deference.
2. Deference Awarded:
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
Though the Court did not label the deference it ultimately confers to the
Secretary of Labor,237 the important consequence of the following case is
that the Court engaged the facts and statutory interpretations each agency
proffered and determined that one agency’s interpretation merited deference
over the other. In Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Commission,238 the controversy arose from the Secretary of Labor’s effort
to enforce compliance with OSHA standards relating to coke-oven
emissions.239 OSHA established a comprehensive regulatory scheme
designed to ensure safe working conditions for all working individuals.240
Here, the Secretary had used his rulemaking powers pursuant to OSHA to
promulgate standards setting the maximum permissible emission levels and
requiring the use of employee respirators in certain conditions.241 A Labor
compliance officer found that the respondent before the Court, CF & I Steel
Corporation, though having equipped many of its employees with
respirators, equipped its employees with respirators that failed to protect
their wearers from coke-oven carcinogenic emissions exceeding the
regulatory limit. 242 Based on these findings, the compliance officer issued
a citation to CF & I for violating the regulation.243
235. Id. at 517.
236. Id.
237. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1117–20 (2008), for further discourse on the Court’s common practice of
engaging in ad hoc judicial reasoning in assessing deference without invoking particular
deference regimes by name.
238. 499 U.S. 144 (1991).
239. Martin, 499 U.S. at 148.
240. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1988).
241. Martin, 499 U.S. at 148.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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At the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC),
an administrative law judge upheld the citation, which included upholding
the Department of Labor’s interpretation of the regulation.244 On petition
for a review of the full Commission, OSHRC reversed the administrative
law judge’s decision, adopting a different interpretation.245 The Secretary
of Labor disagreed with OSHRC’s interpretation and petitioned the Tenth
Circuit for review. 246
Though concluding that the regulations were ambiguous, the Tenth
Circuit found both the Secretary’s interpretation and OSHRC’s
interpretation reasonable. 247 As a result, the court confronted two
permissible interpretations and had to choose to which agency to defer.248
The court ultimately reasoned that because Congress gave OSHRC
adjudicative power, which the Tenth Circuit found to “necessarily
encompass[] the power to ‘declare’ the law,” OSHRC prevailed.249
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.250 The Court considered socalled authority principles and concluded that the Secretary of Labor was
entitled to deference over OSHRC.251 Although the Court considered
several factors,252 the opinion emphasized OSHA’s statutory structure and
the history of the statute.253 The Court found that the Secretary was in the
best position to render authoritative interpretations because the Department
of Labor is the agency authorized to promulgate the standards in the first
instance and, therefore, is more familiar with the regulations’ purposes.254
Moreover, the Court favored the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation because
the Court assumed that Congress wanted interpretive power in the agency
with the most expertise. 255 The Court reasoned that because the Labor
Secretary enforces OSHA, the Department of Labor confronts a wider range
of regulatory problems and is therefore able to develop better expertise.256
In contrast, OSHRC confronts only those problems that the Secretary
contests, seeing only a subset of issues and is less likely to develop
expertise. 257
The Court also considered OSHA’s legislative history, reading the
Congressional Record to suggest that Congress preferred the Secretary’s

244. Id.
245. Id. at 148–49.
246. Id. at 149.
247. Dole v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 891 F.2d 1495, 1497 (10th
Cir. 1989), rev’d sub nom. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499
U.S. 144 (1991).
248. Id. at 1497.
249. Id. at 1498.
250. Martin, 499 U.S. at 150.
251. Id. at 150–54.
252. Id. at 152–58.
253. Id. at 152.
254. Id. at 152–54.
255. Id. at 152–53.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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interpretations.258 Because Congress gave the Secretary the power to
promulgate regulations, the Court reasoned that Congress must have
intended to give the Secretary interpretive authority.259 To hold otherwise
would vest two agencies with implementing OSHA’s policy objectives,
which the Court considered unreasonable.260 The Court held that Congress
delegated to OSHRC limited adjudicative power, 261 distinguishing between
agencies like OSHRC, which exercise only adjudicative authority, and
traditional administrative agencies—agencies that have a unitary structure
composed of legislative, enforcement, and adjudicative powers—which are
free to make law by either regulation or adjudication.262 The Court held
that unitary agencies possess broad authority because Congress delegated to
them power to make law and policy through rulemaking, and since the only
means available to OSHRC was adjudication, the Court declined to “infer
that Congress expected the Commission to use its adjudicatory power to
play a policymaking role.”263
The Court concluded that because OSHRC’s role was similar to the role
of a reviewing court, and similar to the courts’ roles in agency interpretation
matters, OSHRC should not have substituted its judgment for the
Secretary’s.264 Congress authorized OSHRC “to review the Secretary’s
interpretations only for consistency with the regulatory language and for
The Court limited OSHRC’s role to making
reasonableness.”265
authoritative factual findings; as to legal questions, its role is that of a
“neutral arbiter,” undertaking only a limited review of the Secretary’s
interpretations.266
Though important because of the conferral of deference, Martin is not
dispositive on all cases involving shared regulatory space. The Court was
careful to limit its holding to OSHA and declined to take a position “on the
division of enforcement and interpretive powers within other regulatory
schemes that conform to the split-enforcement structure.”267 This caveat
has not prevented other courts from applying this reasoning to the splitenforcement cases they confront. 268 Courts narrowly construing Martin use
it as precedent for OSHA cases only, 269 while other courts broadly
construing Martin use it for split-enforcement models of shared regulatory
space.270 Other courts do not view Martin as dispositive in splitenforcement model cases and accordingly engage in their own reasoning to
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
2006).

Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 153–54.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154–55.
Id.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 158.
See, e.g., Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
See, e.g., Perez v. Loren Cook Co., 750 F.3d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 2014).
See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Twentymile Coal Co., 456 F.3d 151, 161 (D.C. Cir.
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* * *
Taken together, Martin and ETSI can stand as examples that the Supreme
Court does not object to a deference analysis in cases where multiple
agencies administer the same statute. A recent Supreme Court opinion
illustrates that at least a portion of the current Court does not find
multiagency statutes preclusive of deference. In City of Arlington v.
Federal Communications Commission,272 the Court considered whether it
should award Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory
ambiguity that concerned the scope of its regulatory jurisdiction.273 The
majority reasoned that because the statute’s language allowed the agency to
promulgate necessary rules and regulations, the agency’s decision that it
had lawmaking power to fill in the ambiguity was within the scope of its
statutory authority.274 In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by
Justices Kennedy and Alito, stated that “whether a particular agency
interpretation warrants Chevron deference turns on the court’s
determination whether Congress has delegated to the agency the authority
to interpret the statutory ambiguity at issue.”275 And to illustrate his point
regarding what he viewed as the problems of allowing agencies to assert the
boundaries of their jurisdiction, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “statutes
that parcel out authority to multiple agencies . . . ‘may be the norm, rather
than an exception,’”276 and insisted that a court cannot ask “whether the
statute is one that the agency administers,” but rather should ask “whether
authority over the particular ambiguity at issue has been delegated to the
particular agency.”277 The inference from this passage is that a Chevron
analysis is not at odds with a multiagency statute.
3. The Lower Courts Refuse Deference: Salleh v. Christopher
Construed broadly, Martin stands for the proposition that in a splitenforcement model of shared regulatory space, a court considering the
interpretations of the rule-promulgating agency and the reviewing agency
should defer to the rule-promulgating agency; however, the following case
rejects this reasoning and instead holds that where multiple agencies are
responsible for shared space, deference is precluded. In Salleh v.
Christopher278 the Secretary of State discharged Jamari Salleh, a foreign
service officer, even though the Foreign Service Grievance Board
concluded that no cause for the discharge had been established at the

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See, e.g., Hinson v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 57 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
Id. at 1866.
Id. at 1874.
Id. at 1881 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 1883 (quoting Gersen, supra note 1, at 208).
Id. at 1884.
85 F.3d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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applicable hearing.279 The State Department hired plaintiff Salleh in 1981
and subsequently granted her career status.280 In 1989, Salleh pleaded
guilty to an indictment alleging that she filed falsified claims with the U.S.
government.281 After her conviction, the Acting Director General of the
Foreign Service proposed her discharge.282 The Foreign Service Grievance
Board conducted an evidentiary hearing on the discharge proposal and
concluded that discharging Salleh would violate § 501 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 since her criminal conduct stemmed from her alcoholism, a
disability under the Act.283
Thirteen months later, the Secretary of State issued an order concluding
that he “possesse[d] authority to review conclusions of the Foreign Service
Grievance Board, and to reach a contrary conclusion if merited;” and so
concluding, the Secretary of State directed Salleh’s discharge from the
Service. 284 In response, the Board protested, asserting that its decision was
final and that the Secretary could not ignore it.285 Salleh filed an action
under the APA seeking reinstatement, among other remedies. 286 The
district court held that because the Board’s decision was final, the
Secretary’s discharge of Salleh was invalid. 287
The Secretary of State appealed, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.288 The
analysis to determine which agency had final authority hinged on the proper
interpretation of § 610(a) of the Foreign Service Act.289 The Secretary of
State relied on the “plain meaning” of the provision to support his argument
that he had plenary authority to discharge employees and that therefore his
determination was entitled to Chevron deference. 290 The Board, however,
read the provision to delegate to it final authority to determine the validity
of the Secretary’s discharge decisions.291 To bolster its argument, the
Secretary cited a previous D.C. Circuit case where the court had deferred to
the State Department regarding an interpretation of a provision in the same
Act. 292 The court rejected the argument that the previous case created a
general rule that deference is owed to the Secretary, as opposed to the
Board, highlighting that the provision at issue before the previous court
explicitly delegated authority to the Secretary.293
The court held it would be inappropriate to defer to either agency’s
interpretation as to the issue of basic authority, noting it had never deferred
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Molineaux v. United States, 12 F.3d 264, 266–67 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
Id.
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where two competing governmental entities asserted conflicting
jurisdictional claims. 294 The court stated that where Congress has delegated
authority to multiple agencies, it has not implicitly delegated authority “to
reconcile ambiguities or to fill gaps” to any one of those agencies.295 The
court declined to defer to either the Secretary or the Board and instead
opted to interpret the whole section of the statute de novo.296 The court
looked at previous iterations of the particular provision at issue, other
sections of previous iterations of the statute, the legislative history, and the
plain meaning of the provision to determine that the Board had the correct
interpretation of the Act.297
Although the court declined to engage in a deference analysis for either
agency because of the conflict, the means by which the court came to its
determination are illustrative of the types of material courts can consult
when confronted with interagency conflicts over deference (and are in fact
what courts consult generally even in instances of single-agency deference
questions). 298
4. Applying Skidmore Rather than Chevron:
Collins v. National Transportation Safety Board
A court’s application of the less deferential Skidmore analysis to
interagency conflict situations does not resolve the unequal treatment
agencies have received where more than one agency administers the same
statute, although it is arguably a better result than no deference. For
example, in Collins v. National Transportation Safety Board,299 the D.C.
Circuit, in remanding the case back to the district court, speculated that
although Chevron deference was not proper, the Skidmore analysis may
be. 300 In Collins, a Coast Guard administrative law judge made a finding
that a Coast Guard–licensed pilot committed misconduct under the 1972
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS)301
when he failed to sound a warning signal after he ascertained that another
vessel was not taking sufficient action to avoid collision.302 The
Commandant of the Coast Guard affirmed the finding, but the National

294. Id. at 691–92.
295. Id. at 692.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 692–93.
298. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 360–67 and
accompanying text.
299. 351 F.3d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
300. Id. at 1253–54.
301. Though the COLREGS is a treaty and not a statute, the D.C. Circuit found this
distinction did not preclude Chevron application in the first instance. The Circuit noted that
treaty interpretation should be “guided by principles similar to those governing statutory
interpretation.” Id. at 1251 (quoting Iceland S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Dep’t of Army, 201 F.3d 451,
458 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). The Circuit then also cited to Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98, 104 (D.C.
Cir. 2001), where it had applied the Chevron framework to an agency’s interpretation of a
treaty. Collins, 351 F.3d at 1251.
302. Collins, 351 F.3d at 1248–49.
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Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)303 reversed that determination. 304 The
Coast Guard appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and the pilot intervened.305
The differing interpretations turned on the meaning of the word “doubt.”
The Coast Guard interpreted doubt about the sufficiency of the other
vessel’s actions to include both cases where (1) one is uncertain whether
the other vessel’s actions are sufficient and (2) one is certain that those
actions are not sufficient.306 The NTSB found that the COLREGS’s text
specifies that the warning signal requirement is triggered only when a pilot
is “in doubt whether sufficient action [is] being taken by the [other vessel]
to avoid collision.”307 According to the NTSB, “the rule cannot apply
where a pilot is certain that sufficient action is not being taken.”308
The D.C. Circuit viewed the Supreme Court’s split-enforcement opinion
in Martin as similar to the case before the panel and assumed that some
deference was proper.309 The court noted that even if the situation did not
require Chevron deference, Skidmore deference could be applied given the
Coast Guard’s specialized expertise in maritime safety and efficient
administration of licensing and discipline procedures.310 Assuming
Skidmore deference gave the Coast Guard’s decision more weight, the court
found the Coast Guard’s COLREGS interpretation sufficiently persuasive
that the NTSB erred in reversing the Coast Guard Commandant’s
affirmance. 311
Accordingly, this case serves as an example of a court, though typically
resistant of even considering the deference question between two
conflicting agencies, relying on one agency’s specialized expertise and
policy concerns of efficiency—policy considerations that animated Chevron
and Skidmore312—to award Skidmore deference.
B. Policies and Considerations Regarding Interagency Conflicts
Although there is some literature regarding the general topic of shared
regulatory space and interagency conflict,313 not many have written on the
appropriateness of awarding deference to one agency over another agency

303. “The NTSB is an independent agency charged with determining the probable cause
of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety.” Transportation Safety,
NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014). The
Coast Guard is an executive agency under the blanket of the Department of Homeland
Security. USCG: About Us—Overview, U.S. COAST GUARD, http://www.uscg.mil/top/about/
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014).
304. Collins, 351 F.3d at 1249.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 1251.
307. Id. at 1249 (internal quotation marks omitted).
308. Id.
309. Id. at 1251–52.
310. Id. at 1253–54.
311. Id. at 1254.
312. See infra Part I.A.4.
313. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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in multiagency regulatory schemes.314 The following section outlines some
of the discourse available on what factors a court should consider in
reviewing a deference request in cases of interagency conflict.
In his article discussing interagency conflict, Professor Weaver described
an approach where, even though the court cannot defer to both agencies’
interpretations on the subject of jurisdiction between them, the court does
not need to ignore the agencies’ interpretations because both agencies have
expertise and are interpreting their governing statutes.315 Accordingly,
Professor Weaver considers it appropriate to consider the agencies’
competing interpretations.316
In another article, Professor Gersen cites Martin and argues that as
between two agencies conflicting over an interpretation of their governing
statute, “courts should presume that Congress delegated law-interpreting
authority to the more expert agency rather than the less expert agency.”317
In Martin, the Supreme Court reasoned that “[b]ecause historical familiarity
and policymaking expertise account in the first instance for the presumption
that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather
than to the reviewing court,” the Court could presume that “Congress
intended to invest interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best
position to develop these attributes.”318
Further supporting the importance of expertise, Professor Gersen cites
the role it played in the Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. Oregon.319 In that
case, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of expertise when it
declined to defer to the DOJ’s interpretation on the ground that the Attorney
General lacked the relevant expertise.320 The Court held that instead, the
Secretary of Health and Human Services possessed the expertise to consider
health and medical practices.321 However, Professor Gersen notes the
shortcomings of expertise as “too static and exogenous,” since a

314. See Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1293, 1365 (2012) (noting the existence of scholarship examining some courts’
practices of denying agencies deference when considering agencies with shared or
overlapping regulatory responsibilities and the absence of an “assessment of whether such
administrative structures and regulatory designs might support greater judicial deference”);
see also Cooney, supra note 214, at 7 (framing “the question, long identified but not decided
by the Supreme Court,” as “concerning which agency’s interpretation of a statute, if any, is
entitled to deference under [Chevron], when Congress has delegated equal and overlapping
authority to multiple agencies”). But see Weaver, supra note 182, at 277 (arguing that courts
should employ an “ultradeferential form of review” when multiple agencies jointly
promulgate a single rule as that both “advance[s] the likely benefits of coordinated,
multiagency rulemaking” and “ensure[s] that courts do not venture into the policymaking
realm”).
315. Weaver, supra note 151, at 64.
316. Id.
317. Gersen, supra note 1, at 225 (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1991)).
318. Martin, 499 U.S. at 153.
319. Gersen, supra note 1, at 206–07, 225.
320. Id. at 225.
321. Id.
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multiagency regulatory scheme would necessarily facilitate each agency
developing its own expertise.322
Professor Gersen further argues that when multiple agencies administer
one statute, whether one agency’s view about the statute’s meaning receives
deference under Chevron is best treated as a Step Zero inquiry.323
According to Professor Gersen, although political accountability and
expertise are no longer sufficient to support Chevron deference by
themselves, they remain relevant in the Step Zero inquiry if the court
determines that expertise or accountability constitute reasons that Congress
would prefer deference to agencies. 324
Professor Gersen notes that courts regularly use the absence of expertise
to justify not giving deference to agency views of shared jurisdiction
statutes.325 At the same time, and especially in the overlapping jurisdiction
context,326 when several agencies share responsibility for administering a
statute, they all may have more expertise than the generalist courts.327 And
despite having multiple agencies administer the same statute, these agencies
generally will be more responsive to democratic accountability than a
court.328
In contrast, Professor Hammond takes a less favorable approach to
expertise as a dispositive factor.329 Professor Hammond analyzes a
particular kind of agency conflict—one where one agency claims superior
authority via expertise and the other claims it via political accountability—
and determines that the deference question ought to hinge on the text of the
statute and congressional intent.330 Professor Hammond argues that the
judiciary’s focus on these two elements facilitate congressional control,
while still recognizing the policymaking authority of the executive
branch.331
Professor Hammond cites to the very language that Professor Gersen
cites above to argue that expertise is not a compelling factor because the
Court engaged in a statutory analysis aimed at ascertaining Congress’s
intent: “[T]he statute governed the relationship between the agencies and
their respective spheres of authority[, and] once that issue had been decided,
ordinary judicial review was to proceed, with deference as warranted.”332
Most recently, Professor Sharkey proposed a two-point strategy to issues
stemming from shared regulatory space.333 The first is a balkanization
322. Id.
323. Id. at 219.
324. Id. at 220.
325. Id.
326. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
327. Gersen, supra note 1, at 220.
328. Id.
329. Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference
Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763 (2012) [hereinafter Hammond].
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1796.
332. Id. at 1798–99.
333. Sharkey, supra note 207, at 329–31.

2014]

SHARED REGULATORY SPACE AND CHEVRON

1613

strategy, which constrains shared regulatory space by encouraging agencies
to create “separate, non-overlapping spheres of authority.”334 The second
strategy tasks courts with soliciting input from other relevant agencies when
the courts confront an agency both operating in a shared regulatory space
and offering its own interpretation within its delegated shared authority.335
Professor Sharkey posits that “[c]ourts could easily . . . adopt a clear default
rule in overlapping delegations to better facilitate agency coordination and
exploit shared spaces to reach better policy outcomes” by soliciting absent
agency views in determining deference.336
III. THREE STEPS FORWARD: ADDING ONE MORE STEP TO CHEVRON
Some scholarship and courts have recommended that in the context of
overlapping regulatory schemes, Chevron should not apply;337 but that
proposition should not be the entire standard.
The D.C. Circuit divided the types of shared regulatory authorityconferring statutes into three categories: statutes of general applicability,
statutes where a few specialized agencies have potentially overlapping
authority, and statutes where specialized agencies have mutually exclusive
authority. 338 This division is helpful in determining when and how
deference should be accorded. The consensus regarding statutes of general
applicability, like the APA and FOIA, should be followed because it seems
correct that “the broadly sprawling applicability undermines any basis for
Accordingly, courts should review all interpretative
deference.”339
questions arising from conflicting interpretations of general statutes de
novo.340
However, for statutes like the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, where
Congress tasked four agencies with enforcement, 341 and statutes where
expert enforcement agencies have mutually exclusive authority over
separate sets of regulatory space, as outlined by the D.C. Circuit, courts
should adhere to the Chevron doctrine. 342 After all,
[i]f regulatory decisions in the face of ambiguities amount in large part to
choices of policy, and if Congress has delegated basic implementing
authority to the agency, the Chevron approach might reflect a belief,
334. Id. at 330.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 357.
337. See supra notes 202–07 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 299–311 and accompanying text.
339. Collins v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 351 F.3d 1246, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also
supra notes 299–311 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 299–311 and accompanying text.
341. The statute vests authority in the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of Thrift Supervision in the Treasury Department. 12 U.S.C. § 1812 (2012).
342. The D.C. Circuit argued that for statutes like the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, de
novo review may be necessary because, although the agencies have specialized enforcement
responsibilities, their authority potentially overlaps, creating risks of inconsistency or
uncertainty. Collins, 351 F.3d at 1253. Where the regulatory spaces are mutually exclusive,
the D.C. Circuit believes that Chevron deference is not precluded. Id.
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attributable to Congress in the absence of a clear contrary legislative
statement, in the comparative advantages of the agency in making those
choices.343

In the same way that scholars have argued against courts supplanting their
own interpretations for those of the agency, a court’s refusal to award
Chevron deference or to consider the application of the persuasive Skidmore
deference simply because more than one agency has interpretive authority
undermines the deference doctrine and the idea that courts ought not replace
reasonable agency interpretations with their own interpretations.344
Moreover, Congress’s awareness of Chevron bolsters the position that
the legislating body itself prefers that the agencies resolve ambiguities, not
courts.345 Accordingly, to promote the principles outlined above, this Note
proposes an additional step in the Chevron assessment that is applicable
where two or more agencies have proffered reasonable interpretations of a
statute that each administers or where two or more agencies have authority
over the same policy space. Part III.A presents this “Step Three” as a
Skidmore-like analysis that asks the court to consider several factors as part
of a balancing test. Part III.B uses the hypothetical presented in the
Introduction as an example of how the new step would work.
A. The Proposal: Chevron Step Three
As discussed earlier,346 Chevron and Mead provide a three-step inquiry
to determine whether an agency may receive Chevron deference: Step
Zero, Step One, and Step Two. 347 Consider again the hypothetical posed in
the Introduction.348 Assume Congress has delegated to the FDA and USDA
force of law authority to promulgate regulations in the same shared
regulatory space, specifically over the safety of the use of bioengineered
food in breeding cattle. Further assume that each agency interprets the
statute differently so that each interprets “safety” as it understands the term
under its own regulations, and these interpretations directly conflict.
Because ETSI and Martin do not preclude the award of deference to one of
two agencies, 349 a court confronting this situation would apply the current
regime, which begins with Step Zero. 350

343. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2087.
344. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text.
345. Scalia, supra note 45, at 517 (defending Chevron because “Congress now knows that
the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within
the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency”). But
see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 901 (2013) (providing empirical results and analysis outlining what canons and
assumptions congressional staffers do consider in drafting legislation).
346. See supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 47–69 and accompanying text.
348. See supra Introduction.
349. See supra notes 223–77 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 47–69 and accompanying text.
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Step Zero first asks whether Congress had delegated authority to the
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law; in this
hypothetical, Congress has.351 The second part of Step Zero asks whether
the agency promulgated the regulation at issue in the exercise of that
authority; here, the agency has.352 Because the court answered both Step
Zero questions in the affirmative, the court moves to the Chevron two-step
inquiry. 353 Chevron Step One asks whether the statute is ambiguous in its
delegation of authority to the agencies; here, the construction of the statute
is ambiguous with respect to jurisdiction.354 Accordingly, the court moves
to Step Two, which asks whether each agency’s interpretation is a
permissible reading of the statute; in this hypothetical, both agencies have
proffered permissible interpretations.355
The court has determined that both agencies have met the Chevron tests,
but the court cannot award deference to both since their interpretations
conflict. It is at this point that the court should employ a third step to
determine to which agency it ought to defer. Step Three comprises of a sixfactor balancing test; and these factors reflect the considerations and canons
of construction underlying Chevron and Skidmore.
The factors are as follows:
1. Agency Expertise. The Chevron standard values agency expertise and
relies on it as a factor,356 as does the Skidmore standard, which includes
the experience of agencies as guidance.357 Moreover, scholars point to
the comparative competence between the generalist court and specialized
agency in advocating for a presumption of deference.358 Accordingly, it
is reasonable for a court to consider the respective expertise of each
agency in the regulatory space over which the agencies claim
authority.359 On balance, whether an agency has accumulated a particular
expertise and whether the agency relies on that expertise to carry out the
provision at issue can provide a reviewing court one way to distinguish
between two agencies and their reasonable interpretations.
2. Congressional Intent and Legislative History. Although not all
legislative history is reliable,360 there are some types of legislative history
that are highly reliable because they represent an “integral part of the
shared understanding reached by Congress as a whole.”361 These types
of legislative history include (1) instances where one or both houses of
Congress base their decisions for amending or changing a legislative

351. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
355. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
356. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
357. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
358. See supra notes 75–80, 315–28 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 317–28 and accompanying text.
360. James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 48–69 (1994).
361. Id. at 70–74.
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action on statements made in committee reports;362 (2) the report
language of the relevant committees that Congress understands as the
“controlling guidance on a textual provision;”363 and (3) explanatory
statements that comprise all interested legislative opinions when viewed
objectively. 364 And as Professor Hammond notes, the history was
relevant to the determination in Martin and helps to ascertain the true
intent of Congress.365 Courts should further consider the general purpose
of Congress in enacting the statute and the evil the statute was meant to
remedy in assessing whether one agency appears to merit deference. To
the extent they provide explicit guidance for a court, the intent, as gleaned
from the legislative history, provides a second important element to
consider in resolving the issue of deference where there is interagency
conflict.
3. The History of the Statute and the History of the Agency’s
Authority. The history of the statute, its body of amendments and
revisions, is an important consideration for courts to determine the true
intent of Congress—especially where a subsequent piece of legislation
transfers authority from one agency to another.366 If Congress transfers
authority from one agency to another or expands the authority of an
agency, that intent takes precedent over the more outdated legislation.367
In these ways, a court can determine from these considerations an element
of congressional intent to vest certain powers in certain agencies, and as
such, this factor provides a third reasonable element for courts.
4. Political Accountability. Chevron values the democratic system and
notes that unlike the judiciary, agencies are politically accountable, at
least indirectly through the President.368 And also similarly, in arguing
for a presumption favoring deference, scholars point to the political
accountability of agencies over the judiciary. 369 However, the question
of political accountability is more nuanced when the choices are between
two agencies: where the court is determining whether to defer to an
executive agency or to an independent agency, there may be
accountability considerations.370 The traditional understanding is that
executive agencies are more directly accountable, however, recent
scholarship indicates that independent agencies are directly accountable to
a constituency.371 Because the determination is case-specific and certain
362. Id. at 70.
363. Id. at 71.
364. Id. at 73.
365. See supra notes 330–32 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 156–67, 330–31 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 95–101, 156–64 and accompanying text; see also Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862–64 (1984) (focusing on the
interpretation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 rather than the Clean Air Act of
1970 as it represented the intent of Congress).
368. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
369. See supra notes 71–74, 86–88 and accompanying text.
370. See Hammond, supra note 329, at 1774–76.
371. See, e.g., Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies
(and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis,
Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88
B.U. L. REV. 459 (2008); Lanora C. Pettit, Cincinnatus or Caesar: American Czars and the
Appointments Clause, 26 J.L. & POL. 81 (2010); Aaron J. Saiger, Obama’s “Czars” for
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agencies are more independent (or accountable) than others,372 this factor
is helpful to courts considering the question of deference.
5. Whether the Executive Branch Has Weighed in on the Matter.
Related to the previous factor on political accountability, this factor
considers whether the executive branch, either through the President, the
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice, or the White
House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) have
weighed in on the matter. Though this speaks to the Executive’s will and
not the will of Congress, whether and how the Executive has weighed in
should be a consideration because it implicates notions of democratic
accountability.373 Whether it be through executive orders, other
executive announcements,374 OIRA,375 the Solicitor General,376 or
OLC,377 the Executive addressing or weighing in on the matter is
important information for the judiciary to consider. A significant part of
the missions of OIRA and OLC is to resolve conflicts between
agencies,378 and in particular, OIRA’s role is more about coordination
between agencies rather than cost-benefit analysis. In this way, a court
may look at the role of the Executive in balancing the factors for
deference.
6. Thoroughness of Consideration. Rooted in the Skidmore opinion, a
court may consider the process by which the competing agencies came to
their interpretations.379 Courts generally have favored processes that
permit and incorporate public comment, like notice-and-comment
rulemaking. When confronted with one agency that promulgated
regulations without notice and another that undertook a meaningful notice
and comment period,380 the court may find deference applicable to the
latter agency. The consideration of Skidmore factors, both here in factor
six and above in factor three, in a third Chevron step resonates with the
scholarship arguing that Skidmore is an implicit consideration in Step
One.381

Where two agencies, both authorized by the same statute to have
nonexclusive and incomplete jurisdiction over some policy space, have
interpreted a statutory ambiguity in different ways, Step Three will resolve
Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577 (2011);
Tuan Samahon, The Czar’s Place in Presidential Administration, and What the Excepting
Clause Teaches Us About Delegation, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 169; Jonathan D. Puvak, Note,
Executive Branch Czars, Who Are They? Are They Needed? Can Congress Do Anything
About Them?, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1091 (2011).
372. Datla & Revesz, supra note 371, at tbl. 8.
373. See supra notes 71–74, 86–88 and accompanying text.
374. Vivek V. Nemane, Food and Agricultural Security Strategy and Its Implementation
Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 317, 322 (2012) (discussing the Homeland Security Presidential
Directives).
375. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1178–81.
376. Datla & Revesz, supra note 371, at 801–04.
377. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 1, at 1175–76.
378. Id. at 1175–78.
379. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 95–101 and accompanying text.
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the conflict. That the statute authorizes both agencies to have enforcement
power meets the Step Zero threshold.
That the statute contains
ambiguities—assuming no other provision of the statute precludes one or
both of the agencies from exercising authority—meets Step One. And
assuming that both interpretations are reasonable, meeting Step Two, the
court is left with two interpretations that could be awarded Chevron
deference. Step Three provides a framework for courts to use to determine
to which agency to defer.
As Justice Stevens’s opinion in Chevron notes, by passing ambiguous
statutes, Congress has explicitly or implicitly delegated power to
administrative agencies to fill in the gaps of the statute.382 This suggests
that courts should defer to an agency because of the ambiguity.383 Step
Three is consistent with and seeks to further this argument by encouraging
courts to use the relevant principles and policies to balance and determine
which agency should be filling in those gaps.
As a temporal matter, it is preferable that this balancing test be a third
step rather than at the initial phase because, to the extent that any one or all
of the agencies do not pass through either of the well-established Chevron
steps,384 the court need not consider the Step Three factors at all. Because
engaging in a standards test, such as the one proposed, requires the court to
balance several factors, it would be in the interest of judicial economy if a
court could resolve the conflict at any of those threshold marks.
Professor Sunstein’s remarks about Chevron carry the same force with
respect to the proposed Step Three; just like Chevron, the Step Three
assessment should not be “a mechanical exercise of uncovering an actual
legislative decision,” but one which “calls for a frankly value-laden
judgment about comparative competence, undertaken in light of the
regulatory structure and applicable constitutional considerations.”385
B. Step Three at Work
Returning to the hypothetical posed in the Introduction,386 Step Three
would allow a court to resolve the dispute. The Introduction presented a
piece of legislation aimed at ensuring the safety of bioengineered food fed
to cattle, as well as a subsequent conflict between the FDA and the USDA
over the interpretation of the word “safety” as used in their authorizing
statute. Using Step Three, a court could balance the facts and factors to
determine that the USDA should receive deference.
382. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984).
383. Id.; accord Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 417, 419 (1899) (stating that “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask
only what the statute means”).
384. See ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495 (1988). In ETSI, the Court
found a resolution at Step One, holding that the Flood Control Act gave explicit authority to
the Department of the Army and did not give that same authority to the Department of the
Interior. Id. at 517.
385. Sunstein, supra note 42, at 2086.
386. See supra Introduction.
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Considering (1) agency expertise, though both the FDA and USDA have
their particularized expertise—the FDA having oversight over food safety
standards for almost all food products and the USDA having oversight over
the food safety standards related to, among other things, meat—a court
reviewing the scope of each agency’s jurisdiction would determine that the
USDA has honed a more specialized expertise in the safety of meat
products over the FDA. Moreover, the court would look at the fact that the
USDA had been honing this expertise for over fifty years before the FDA
even received authority in the same general regulatory space. In so doing,
the court would find that, on balance, expertise favored the USDA.
Examining (2) congressional intent and legislative history, the court may
determine that Congress wanted the FDA to take control of this regulatory
space because the 1958 statute came later in time, reflecting a new intent on
the part of Congress to vest the FDA with this power. The court would
undertake a review of the legislative history to see whether the
congressional members discussed the topic of transferring authority and
would consider the results of that search. Here, the hypothetical does not
note any legislative history.
Reviewing (3) the history of the statute and the history of the agency
authority, the court may determine that on balance, both agencies have
claims to deference. For substantially the same reasons articulated in
assessing factor (2), the court could find that the history of the agency
authority tended to support a new direction by Congress, finding the FDA
prevailed in this factor. On the other hand, the court could view the history
of the statute, again paying particular focus to the number of years that the
USDA had been overseeing this policy space, and determine that on
balance, the USDA was the agency Congress intended to regulate the policy
space.
Considering (4) political accountability, the court would initially note
that both agencies are executive agencies but would ultimately determine
that the USDA is the more politically accountable agency. Historically, the
FDA has enjoyed practical independence from presidential influence (as
well as other political and interest group pressure) because of its effective
role as a watchdog agency,387 whereas the USDA enjoys very little
independence.388
Reaching (5) whether the executive branch has weighed in on the matter,
the hypothetical is silent on the role of the executive branch, and
accordingly, the court would not consider the factor in its analysis. Because
a balancing test is a value determination rather than a threshold inquiry, the
absence of one factor or information allowing the consideration of one
factor does not negate the utility of the balancing test.
And finally, examining (6) the thoroughness of the consideration, the
court would review the scientific thoroughness of the USDA’s methods in
reaching its interpretation of safety against the means by which the FDA
387. Datla & Revesz, supra note 371, at 817–18.
388. Id. at 825.
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reached its interpretation of safety. Although the FDA’s interpretation is
more stringent, if the court determines that the USDA’s methods were more
thorough, the court would ultimately find that the USDA was the agency
meant to regulate the policy space.
Having walked through each factor, the court would see that the majority
of the factors, and the weight of those factors as compared to the weight of
factors urging for the FDA, compel the conclusion that the USDA is the
agency to which the court owes deference. This hypothetical presents a
simple set of facts that lend themselves to a resolution of the conflict via
Step Three.
CONCLUSION
Chevron provides the framework for a court considering whether to
award deference to a single agency’s interpretation of its authorizing
statute, but because Congress increasingly enacts multiagency statutes,
courts increasingly confront both interagency conflicts and deference
problems arising from the very existence of shared regulatory space. In
reviewing these conflicts and problems, courts have employed a variety of
rationales, and usually have declined to award any deference.
This Note argues that multiagency statutes do not preclude agency
deference and that courts should undertake a modified Chevron analysis to
determine deference. The goal of this Note is to afford similar deference
principles to agencies authorized under multiagency schemes as those
agencies authorized under single-agency schemes. The application of
Chevron deference should not turn on how many agencies Congress
authorizes to regulate a particular policy space but rather on the principles
that the Supreme Court has articulated through the years in awarding
deference to agencies. A balancing test that considers these principles
preserves the separation of powers between the judiciary and the agencies,
promotes uniformity in a national administrative regime, and fosters
internal coherence within the law.

